A. Provocation of an unlawful/ criminal act/Incitement

I. Topicality of the issue
On 22
nd July 2016 a rampage occurred in
Munich resulting in the death of 9 victims in total and the homicidal maniac committing suicide in the end. In the course of the criminal investigations suspicion arose that the offender may have obtained the weapon that he used for the criminal act in the so-called "darknet", the part of the internet that is not freely accessible.
Thereupon the police supposedly deployed an undercover agent who assumed the identity of a known weapon dealer in the "darknet" in order to get into contact with another person operating in the "darknet" who was suspected to have supplied the weapon to the perpetrator of the rampage in Munich. Apparently, this person in turn assumed the undercover agent to be a potential purchaser and then manifested interest in an arms deal.
Whilst the fictitious deal was being carried out, the suspect was arrested. His co-liability for the rampage in Munich is currently being investigated.
Back in 2015, in a completely different case in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate, the police set up a fake rocker unit consisting of police officers that was especially designed for the purpose of adopting provocative behaviour vis-à-vis a local group of the Bandidos rocker gang in order to make them commit acts of violence.
This measure aimed at arresting those members of the Bandidos involved in the acts of violence and submit them to criminal prosecution.
Having regard to the concrete course of the police operations the question whether the public authorities exercised an illegitimate provocation contrary to essential principles of the rule of law will have to be addressed in both criminal proceedings, possibly entailing considerable procedural consequences for the further development of the trial.
II. European human rights framework
On the subject matter of unlawful
provocation (incitement) of a criminal act the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in
Strasbourg has delivered judgments repeatedly during the last few years in cases against Russia (Vanyan, Bannikova) as well as against Germany (Furcht, Scholer) .
In doing so, the Court has made it clear that -from a human rights perspective -covert investigation of police officers (which the ECtHR refers to as undercover agents) admissible under the rule of law only amounts to a mere passive investigation of existing criminal activity.
In contrast, the ECtHR considers the use of so-called inciting agents (agents provocateurs) that is to be distinguished strictly from the abovementioned investigation to be incompatible with principles of the rule of law and therefore as contrary to human rights. In the Approaching the issue on the human rights level in detail, there are essentially three distinct problems:
Article 1 ECHR holds the Contracting Parties accountable only for actions attributable to public authorities within their jurisdiction. As a first step it is therefore necessary to determine whether the state is responsible for a covertly operating person and him or her getting into contact with the later accused.
In addition to the direct use of state agencies, T purchased this quantity from a supplier. The transaction was to be carried out in the flat of a third party. There, T was arrested. 20 grams of heroin and a larger amount of cash were found with T.
The ECtHR concluded that the applicant had -ab initio and irrevocably -been deprived of his right to a fair trial (Article 6 para. 1 ECHR)
by the influence of the undercover agents. The
Court did not assume a later compensation for this shortcoming (anymore).
The criteria the ECtHR applied already at that time arouse interest. An essential aspect was that the use of covert investigators had occurred without judicial order in the first place as well as without subsequent independent monitoring of the operation. Furthermore, the ECtHR emphasized that no good reasons for suspecting the later accused (predisposition) were at hand at the beginning of the deployment of the undercover agent. The fact that the applicant had potentially been predisposed was not considered to be sufficient as an argument against incitement.
An additional argument which underlines the concrete case to amount to incitement and which can regularly be found in judgments of the ECtHR is the fact that, at the time of the establishment of contact with the undercover agent, the suspect had had no previous criminal record in the field of the crime in which the allegedly provoked action later took place. Like 3. Later, the judgment in Ramanauskas v. Lithuania was taken note of more intensely, also by German academics. 8 The peculiarity of this case was that the applicant was a former prosecutor who was accused of corruption.
According to the Court's finding an undercover agent had offered him $ 3,000 for the acquittal of a third party which the applicant was asked to support. The applicant accepted this offer only after the covert investigator (member of an anticorruption unit) had insisted several times.
As criteria for the assumption of incitement the Court took into account on whose initiative the offence had eventually been committed.
Criminal records were taken into account, as well as whether there had been objective indications for a criminal activity on the part of the applicant.
Mere rumours, however, were not considered being sufficient for this purpose. operation on the basis of the audio-monitoring, the judgment is nevertheless of high relevance for the judiciary and the criminal defence.
It underlines the need for a separation between the examination of the substantive requirements of an incitement (first step) and the procedure carried out to establish a possible provocation (second step).
The applicant has to be given the possibility to verify an incitement in an adversarial procedure that is thoroughly conducted and ultimately directed at the existence of a provocation.
In doing so, the national courts must submit the reasons of the covert investigation to an exhaustive examination. A guilty plea of the defendant does not render such an enquiry dispensable.
IV. Summary: Entrapment v. Investigation
The use of liaison men and undercover agents is not per se considered to be contrary to the ECHR by the ECtHR. As the Court has already highlighted in Lüdi 13 and Teixeira 14 there are areas of crime that make the use of undercover techniques (infiltration) appear to be necessary and therefore also legitimate.
In a dogmatically convincing way the Court distinguishes between a permissible undercover work and incitement (entrapment) that is not admissible under a human rights perspective.
An central criterion developed by the Court for this purpose was whether criminal activity was investigated in an essentially passive manner or an ongoing offence merely joined ("investigate the offence") or whether influence was exerted as to incite a person to commit a crime.
Whether criminal activity that was merely accompanied by public authorities was already existing at the time of the getting into contact with the suspect is assessed on the basis of indications.
For this purpose, it is of major importance to establish whether the offence would not have been committed without the state's contribution.
Here, the Court stresses the idea of causation.
However, the ECtHR's jurisprudence does not provide exact guidelines on how to assess the particular "state contribution" regarding its impact or relevance.
Another criterion for a ("non-passive") incitement is the lack of "verifiable" suspicious A possible sign for a provocation can be a lack of previous, in particular factually relevant, criminal convictions, whereas on the other hand a corresponding criminal record does not necessarily entail the conclusion that no incitement was carried out.
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In the area of drug-related crime it is of further relevance whether the person concerned is familiar with the prices of narcotics, disposes of opportunities to procure them and displays a certain profit seeking. However, it is not discernible, leave alone comprehensible, why the applicant ought still to be subject to extensive (investigation) procedures although proceedings based on incitement are initially marked with the blemish of a lack of procedural fairness. This is particularly striking where the circumstances of the case would give way to pre-trial detention.
After all, there is a particular risk for the defendant that a confession he made under the impact of the incitement will be used to his disadvantage in the trial. Similarly, Section 147 para. 7 StPO which indeed does not grant a suspect undetained and without defence counsel full access to the file, but at least entitles the defendant to obtain disclosure and transcripts of the documents as far as it is necessary for a reasonable defence, is due to Strasbourg's judisdiction. In the end, the German legislator will be required to amend these provisions, too.
E. Résumé
The above mentioned examples clearly This shows once again that, of course, the implementation of international standards is highly dependent upon the distinct decision making bodies, the individuals operating within the judiciary and their affinity for international legal thinking.
The German legislator, on the other hand, lately recognizes more and more frequently that a behaviour contrary to international law, thus a compensation-relevant behaviour of the national judiciary (be it because of a misleading wording of the law or be it based on a hardly comprehensible insistence on national legal theory) needs to be overcome by adapting the national law to the international legal framework through means of respective legislative amendments.
"Human rights in criminal proceedings"
therefore certainly seem to constitute a decent sounding dogma, if used to remind or reproach political co-players, maybe even to assess them.
Perceiving a deficiency as to human rights in one's own well cultivated, familiar political and legal sphere and reacting thereto in a consistent way, however, appears to be considerably harder. The following presentation does not comprehensively retrace the ECtHR`s jurisdiction on the issue of incitement, but is merely bound to serve as a basic outline of essential guidelines developed by the Court between 1998 and 2010. 
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Another securing mechanism for this is that an infringement of this obligation can be brought before the German Federal Constitutional Court as a breach of the corresponding (parallel) basic right conjointly with the rule of law principle (Article 20 para. 3 of the German Constitution). 
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